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Designing as Playing Games of Make-Believe 
















how statements about what is fictionally true can be correct. Philosophers of science, notably Roman Frigg (2010) and Adam Toon (2012), have applied Walton’s ideas to understanding how scientists can use models of scientific phenomena to understand these phenomena, when they know that the models are simplifications or are wrong in significant ways; and to trying to understand what scientific models are.  2.1. Walton’s make-believe theory According to a common perspective on fiction, works of fiction such as novels, as well as paintings and other artworks define fictional worlds in which certain statements are fictionally 
true. For example, in the world of Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories a statement like ‘Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street, London’ is fictionally true while a statement like ‘Moriarty was a professor of engineering design’ is not fictionally true.  According to Walton’s (1990) theory, appreciating a representational artwork involves participating in a game of make-believe by imagining that its content were true, and inferring what follows from that, while remaining aware that it is fiction. Objects that contribute to games of make-believe are props, a term he has borrowed from theatre. Props can be objects used in games, like hobby horses or puppets, as well as game elements such as title deed cards in Monopoly; for instance, a broom could be used to play an imagination game involving riding, making ‘Sangeeta is now riding the horse’ a fictionally true statement. Players are supposed to 




are implied (cf. Walton, 1990, 140). The implied fictional truths are implied by primary ones and principles of generation. Two candidates for principles of generation are the Reality Principle and the Mutual Belief Principle. These are widely discussed in the scholarly literature on fiction.  Concerning the first Walton writes:  
The basic strategy which the Reality Principle attempts to codify is that of making fictional worlds 
as much like the real one as the core of primary fictional truths permits. It is because people in the 
real world have blood in their veins, births, and backsides that fictional characters are presumed to 
possess these attributes. (Walton, 1990, 144)   Concerning the second one he writes:  
A storyteller, in a culture in which it is universally and firmly agreed that the earth is flat and that 
to venture too far out to sea is to risk falling off, invents a yarn about bold mariners who do sail far 
out to sea. No mention is made in the story of the shape of the earth or the danger. That would be 
unnecessary, the teller thinks, for he and his audience assume the earth in the story to be shaped as 
they believe it is in reality. (Walton, 1990, 150)   Walton problematises both of them. They deliver adequate answers in many cases but not in all cases.  
Both will turn out to be seriously inadequate when measured against the subtleties and 
complexities of actual implications. Nevertheless, many implications do conform to one or the 
other of them, and recognizable variants are at work in some other cases. (144)  
The unruly behavior of the machinery of generation makes life hard for critics. But it is no threat to 
the theorist; it presents the artist with exciting opportunities; and it is a rich source of fascination 






Figure 1 Overview of Waltonian concepts (open arrowheads indicate derivation relationships; 



























 The object also does not need to be of the same kind. In many fields, designers draw on ideas very widely and use them as sources of inspiration or to frame the space of possible designs in discussion (see Eckert et al, 2005; Stacey et al, 2009). This might be less the case for jet engine components, where the problems are tightly constrained and plausible solutions have precedents. However, jet engine designers look at other industry sectors for materials or manufacturing processes. 




































the risk of so-called churn, where a team works on modifying a solution without achieving a practical improvement. Jet engine design is in some ways an extreme case of design, because it has well established classes of solutions, which which can be fully described with values for a fixed set of parameters. Uncertainty arises from three main sources: 
• The science of high temperature physics and material science as established solution principles are pushed to their limits with new materials. 
• The changing requirements from the end customers; for example, around 2000 with the introduction of on-board entertainment systems the amount of electrical power required by aircrafts increased dramatically so that it affected both the configuration of jet engines and the power for thrust they could provide. 
























al, 2013), the end of the design process is when the definition of the design has transitioned from Concept Space, where propositions do not have truth values, to Knowledge Space, where propositions are established and do have truth values.   6. Discussion This paper presents a new lens for thinking about how designers design – one that helps us understand how they deal with assumptions and uncertainties. Our purpose is to make sense of 
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